Personal Health Records, published by HL7 International / Patient Empowerment. This guide is not an authorized publication; it is the continuous build for version 1.0.0-ballot2 built by the FHIR (HL7® FHIR® Standard) CI Build. This version is based on the current content of https://github.com/HL7/personal-health-record-format-ig/ and changes regularly. See the Directory of published versions
| Page standards status: Informative |
Personal Health Records spend most of their life at rest — on a phone, a laptop, a thumbdrive, or a CD in a shoebox — punctuated by occasional transfers between systems. The security model of this guide follows that reality: protect data at rest with the encryption facilities of the operating system and storage volume, and protect data in transit with the transport layer. This guide does not define its own file-level encryption or signing scheme.
.phr files are plain text (NDJSON), and .sphr files are ordinary zip archives. Neither format is self-protecting, and systems MUST NOT treat possession of a .phr or .sphr file as evidence of authorization. Anyone who can read the file can read the record. Protection comes from the environment the file lives in, not from the file itself.
Earlier drafts of this guide specified passphrase- and public-key-based encryption of .sphr files. That approach was removed: bespoke file-level cryptography creates key-management burdens (key distribution, recovery, revocation) that consumer PHR applications have not implemented in practice, and it gives patients a false sense that an exported file is "safe" to leave anywhere. Connectathon testing across six systems (Sept 2026) exercised none of the file-level cryptography; all systems relied on transport and volume security.
Systems that store PHR data — and patients who keep exported files — SHOULD rely on volume-level or file-system-level encryption provided by the platform:
| Platform | Mechanism |
|---|---|
| macOS | FileVault full-disk encryption |
| Windows | BitLocker drive encryption |
| Linux | LUKS/dm-crypt volume encryption |
| iOS | File-based Data Protection (enabled by default) |
| Android | File-based encryption (enabled by default) |
| Removable media (USB, external drives) | Hardware-encrypted drives, or an encrypted volume (BitLocker To Go, FileVault-formatted volume, VeraCrypt) |
Guidance for implementers and for patient-facing documentation:
.phr/.sphr files to removable media for physical exchange, the media itself SHOULD be encrypted, or the file SHOULD be placed in an encrypted container.Data integrity and authorship questions are handled with FHIR's standard mechanisms rather than file-level signatures: Provenance resources record who created and transformed each record, and AuditEvent records access. See the Merging and Versioning page for how provenance supports reconciliation across sources.
The PHR-S Functional Model defines the complete catalog of security, audit, and infrastructure conformance criteria for PHR systems (sections TI.1 Security and TI.2 Audit, including authentication, authorization, access control, non-repudiation, and audit triggers). PHR system implementers SHOULD consult the functional model directly; this guide does not restate those system-level requirements, since this guide's scope is the record format and its exchange rather than the system that hosts it.