Netherlands - Generic Functions for data exchange Implementation Guide
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Netherlands - Generic Functions for data exchange Implementation Guide, published by Stichting Nuts. This guide is not an authorized publication; it is the continuous build for version 0.3.0 built by the FHIR (HL7® FHIR® Standard) CI Build. This version is based on the current content of https://github.com/nuts-foundation/nl-generic-functions-ig/ and changes regularly. See the Directory of published versions

DeziUserCredential

DeziUserCredential

This specification specifies the DeziUserCredential and includes steps to create and verify the credential.

The credential is a non-standard credential since it wraps the Dezi OIDC ID-Token and allows a verifier to interact with it like it is a verifiable credential. This allows the information from Dezi to be combined with other credentials during the authentication process. Ideally the issuer will in time issue the information in a VC format which will make this specification obsolete.

Overview

Purpose: Assert the identity of a Dezi entity (user) and its relationship to a healthcare provider.

Issuer: Dezi

Subject: The healthcare provider in the role of employer to the Dezi person.

Status: draft

Terminology:

Claim Code or system
HealthcareProvider.identifier URA code (UZI Register Abonneenummer) identifying the healthcare organization. OID: 2.16.528.1.1007.3.3
Employee.identifier UZI/Dezi-id code identifying the healthcare worker. OID: 2.16.528.1.1007.3.1
Employee.role valueset RoleCodeNL for care givers
Employee.role_name Human-readable name of the role
Employee.role_registry Registry from which the role originates (e.g., http://www.dezi.nl/rol_bron/big)

Semantic relations

The credential expresses the following graph structure:

graph TD
    VC[DeziUserCredential]
    VC -->|credentialSubject| HP[HealthcareProvider]
    HP -->|id| DID["did:web:za1.example"]
    HP -->|identifier| URA["87654321 (URA)"]
    HP -->|name| NAME["Zorgaanbieder"]
    HP -->|employs| HW[HealthcareWorker]
    HW -->|identifier| UZI["900000009 (UZI/Dezi-nummer)"]
    HW -->|initials| INIT["B.B."]
    HW -->|surnamePrefix| PRE["van der"]
    HW -->|surname| SUR["Jansen"]
    HW -->|role| ROLE["01.041"]
    HW -->|role_name| ROLENAME["Revalidatiearts"]
    HW -->|role_registry| ROLEREG["http://www.dezi.nl/rol_bron/big"]

Example credential

The following is a non-normative example of a DeziUserCredential. It asserts that Healthcare Provider Medisch centrum (URA 87654321) employs B.B. van der Jansen with UZI 87654321 in the role of Revalidatiearts.

{
  "@context": [
    "https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
    "https://example.org/contexts/dezi/v1"
  ],
  "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "DeziUserCredential"],
  "issuer": "did:web:dezi.nl",
  "validFrom": "2026-31-07T11:15:27Z",
  "validUntil": "2026-30-07T11:16:37Z",
  "credentialSubject": {
    "@type": "HealthcareProvider",
    "id": "did:web:zorgaanbieder.example",
    "identifier": "87654321",
    "name": "Medisch centrum",
    "employee": {
      "@type": "HealthcareWorker",
      "identifier": "900000009",
      "initials": "B.B.",
      "surnamePrefix": "van der",
      "surname": "Jansen",
      "role": "01.041",
      "role_name": "Revalidatiearts",
      "role_registry": "http://www.dezi.nl/rol_bron/big"
    }
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DeziIDJWT07",
    "jwt": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjMyNWRlOWFiLTQzMzAtNGMwMS04MjRlLWQ5YmQwYzM3Y2NhMCIsImprdSI6Imh0dHBzOi8vYXV0aC5kZXppLm5sL2p3a3MuanNvbiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.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.SIGNATURE"
  }
}

Creating the Credential from a Dezi Attestation

To create a DeziUserCredential from a Dezi attestation, perform the following mapping:

Credential field Source Description
@context Static Always ["https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2", "https://example.org/contexts/dezi/v1"]
type Static Always ["VerifiableCredential", "DeziUserCredential"]
issuer jwt.iss The Dezi issuer, represented as a URL (e.g., https://max.proeftuin.Dezi-online.rdobeheer.nl)
validFrom jwt.nbf Convert epoch timestamp to ISO 8601 datetime
validUntil jwt.exp Convert epoch timestamp to ISO 8601 datetime
credentialSubject.id Derived DID representing the healthcare provider
credentialSubject.identifier jwt.abonnee_nummer Abonnee nummer (URA) of the healthcare provider
credentialSubject.name jwt.abonnee_naam Name of the healthcare organization
credentialSubject.employee.identifier jwt.dezi_nummer The healthcare worker's Dezi number
credentialSubject.employee.initials jwt.voorletters Initials of the healthcare worker
credentialSubject.employee.surnamePrefix jwt.voorvoegsel Surname prefix
credentialSubject.employee.surname jwt.achternaam Family name of the healthcare worker
credentialSubject.employee.role jwt.verklaring.rol_code Role code for the selected organization
credentialSubject.employee.role_name jwt.verklaring.rol_naam Human-readable name of the role
credentialSubject.employee.role_registry jwt.verklaring.rol_code_bron Registry from which the role originates (e.g., http://www.dezi.nl/rol_bron/big)
proof.type Static Always DeziIDJWT
proof.jwt Input The original signed JWT from Dezi

Notes on creation:

  • The credentialSubject.id should be constructed as a DID that identifies the healthcare provider. The exact method depends on the DID infrastructure in use.
  • Timestamps in the JWT (nbf, exp) are Unix epoch seconds and must be converted to ISO 8601 format.

Validation

Validation of this credential is non-typical since the issuer does not issue the credential itself but a signed attestation. The proof.type of this credential is a custom DeziIDJWT07 where the 07 suffix indicates that it contains an attestation ("verklaring"), as specified in the 0.7 version of the Vendor Specification.

Validation consists of the following steps:

  1. Verify the Dezi attestation JWT version (indicated by the credential proof type suffix) is supported by the implementation.
  2. Verify the attestation JWT following the instructions of Dezi (signature validation using JWKS from the jku header claim, expiration checks, etc.)
  3. Verify the revocation status according to Dezi's revocation endpoint.
  4. Verify that the values from the credential subject match with the values in the JWT:
Credential path JWT path Validation rule
vc.issuer jwt.iss Must match (after DID resolution if applicable)
vc.validFrom jwt.nbf Must be equal (converted to epoch)
vc.validUntil jwt.exp Must be equal (converted to epoch)
vc.credentialSubject.identifier jwt.abonnee_nummer Must match the abonnee nummer
vc.credentialSubject.name jwt.abonnee_naam Must match the abonnee name
vc.credentialSubject.employee.identifier jwt.dezi_nummer Must be equal
vc.credentialSubject.employee.initials jwt.voorletters Must be equal
vc.credentialSubject.employee.surnamePrefix jwt.voorvoegsel Must be equal (both may be null)
vc.credentialSubject.employee.surname jwt.achternaam Must be equal
vc.credentialSubject.employee.role jwt.verklaring.rol_code Must be equal
vc.credentialSubject.employee.role_name jwt.verklaring.rol_naam Must be equal
vc.credentialSubject.employee.role_registry jwt.verklaring.rol_code_bron Must be equal

Proof of possession

Normally, VCs bind to a subject through credentialSubject.id, typically a DID that the holder can prove control over (for example, by including the credential in a Verifiable Presentation and signing the VP with an assertion key associated with the DID). This credential differs: Dezi does not verify or include credentialSubject.id in the JWT. The binding is instead through credentialSubject.identifier (the URA code).

To establish proof of possession, the verifier must:

  1. Obtain an additional credential that asserts the holder's relationship to the URA identifier
  2. Verify that the credentialSubject.identifier in this credential matches the URA asserted in the accompanying credential
  3. Verify the holder controls the DID in the accompanying credential through standard proof of possession mechanisms

This means DeziUserCredential cannot be used standalone for authentication. It must be presented alongside a credential that binds the holder's DID to the healthcare provider identifier (URA).

It also means credentialSubject.identifier (the URA) in this credential cannot be treated as a verified claim about the healthcare provider. It is included for structural compatibility with the VC data model, but carries no cryptographic assurance from Dezi.

Encoding and Limitations

This credential can only be expressed using JSON or JSON-LD encoding with a custom DeziIDJWT07 proof type (where 07 indicates Dezi v0.7). Unlike standard VC proofs, the proof does not contain a signature over the credential. Instead, it embeds the original Dezi attestation:

{
  "proof": {
    "type": "DeziIDJWT07",
    "jwt": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIs..."
  }
}

Authenticity is established by validating the embedded attestation JWT according to Dezi specifications, then verifying that credential claims match the JWT claims.

Why not JWT encoding? The VC Data Model 1.1 JWT encoding requires the credential issuer to sign the JWT. Since the Dezi attestation is obtained from the OIDC userinfo endpoint (not as a VC-JWT) and we cannot control its structure, we wrap it instead.

Limitations

Since this proof is non-standard, VC libraries might not be able to validate it out of the box and custom validation is required. Also, since claims appear in both the credential and the embedded attestation JWT, the validation needs to check for consistency between the two.